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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
HERSCHEL J. SAPERSTEIN, 
Trustee in llankrupky of the Estate of 
\VIIEAT BROS. PAINTERS & 
DECORATORS, a partnership, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
FIRST SECURITY BANK OF 
CTAH, N.A., a corporation, 
Defendant and Aprellt111f. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
NATURE OF CASE 
Case No. 
11768 
This is an action under Section 60b of the Bank-
ruptcy Act ( 11 U.S.C. §96) to recover on behalf of the 
bankruptcy estate three separate sums transferred, in 
the form of bank deposits, by the bankrupt ('Vheat 
Bros.) to defendant First Security Bank of Utah within 
1 
four months before the voluntary petition in bankruptcy 
was filed. · 
DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT 
After a trial without a jury, the court found that 
the three deposits were made and receive<l for the pur-
pose of paying an antecedent debt, were not in the ordi-
nary course of business, and were voidable preferences 
under the Bankruptcy Act. .A.ccordingly, it entered 
judgment in favor of the plaintiff and against the de-
fendant in the amount of $27 ,331.25, together with in-
terest of $3,624.62, and $52.60 costs. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the judgment. 
STATE.NIENT OF FACTS 
The facts set out in appellant's brief are essentially 
correct, but incomplete. Failure to set out all of the 
material evidence presented at the trial creates a serious 
problem, because notwithstanding that appellant's brief 
is cast primarily in the form of legal argument about 
application of certain sections of the Bankruptcy Act, 
the appeal is essentially an attack upon the sufficiency 
of evidence to support findings of fact ma<le by the trial 
court. 
2 
Under Section (}O of the Bankruptcy Act any 
transfer made by the bankrupt is to be set aside if the 
trustee establishes the following: 
( 1) There was a transfer of property by the bank-
rupt; 
(:.:?) At the time of ihe transfer the transferee was 
a creditor of the bankrupt; 
( H) The transfer was made in payment of an an-
tecedent debt; 
( 4) The bankrupt was insolvent at the time of the 
transfer; 
( 5) The transfer was made wtihin four months 
before the filing of a petition in bankruptcy; 
( 6) The transfer enabled the transferee to obtain 
a greater percentage of its debt than other creditors of 
the same class; and 
( 7) At the time of the transfer the transferee had 
reasonable cause to believe that the bankrupt transferor 
was insolvent. 
[See ;3 Collier on B((11kruptc,1; (14th Ed.), Para. 
150.0:.2; 9 Am. Jur. 2d, Bankruptcy, 
The trial court made findings iu plaintiff's favor on 
eaeh of the above issues ( R. 18-21), and most of the 
fi11dings have not been challenged. For the purpose of 
this appeal it must be deemed to be established that 
there were three transfers of property by 'Vheat Bros. 
3 
to defendant (Findings Nos. 5, 10, 14); defendant was 
a creditor (Findings Nos. 4, 9, 13) ; lVheat Bros. was 
insolvent at the time of eaeh transfer (Finding No. 18); 
each transfer ·was made within four months before the 
petition in bankruptcy was filed (Finding No. 17); and 
the transfers enabled defendant to obtain a greater por-
tion of its debt than other creditors of the same class 
(Finding No. 21). 
The findings challenged in this appeal are that 
the transfers were for the purpose of paying antecede11t 
debts (Findings Nos. 8, 12, 16), and that defendant had 
reasonable cause to believe (and in fact knew) \\Theat 
Bros. was inso!Yent at the time of each transfer (Find-
ings Nos. 19, 20) . 
Both of the challenged findings involve states of 
mind best known to defendant and its officers. In con-
sidering the findings, therefore, the court should giYe 
weight to the facts that most of the information sur-
rounding the deposits is in the hands of the defendant; 
that the plaintiff, representing the general creditors of 
Wheat Bros., had to rely upon circumstantial evidence 
to establish the relevant state of mind as it existed at the 
time the transaction were entered into; and that defend-
ants were not likely to publish their intent. 
The facts and circumstances surrounding the deal-
ings between \Vheat Bros. and defendant - both before 
and after the transfers - affect the credibility of testi-
mony presented by defendant. :Most of them are set 
4 
out immediately below. Others will be dealt with spe-
cially in the argument. 
\Vheat llros., a partnership consisting of James L. 
\Vheat, .John Wheat and Joseph \Vheat (R. 47), was 
a customer of defendant :First Security Bank. Prior to 
the filing of the petition in bankruptcy, \Vheat Bros. 
maintained a general checking account at the Sugar-
house office of defendant bank ( R. 73), and from time 
to time also borrowed money from it ( R. 7 4). During 
the period immediately preceding the deposits in ques-
tion, \Vheat Bros. was indebted to defendant on two 
separate $5,000.00 notes, one dated May 19, 1U65, ma-
turing August 17, 1965, and one dated July 13, 1965, 
maturing October 11, 1965 (R. 74; Ex. P-14). 
In August, 1965, the \Vheat Bros. account went 
into an overdraft condition ( R. 76) , which gradually 
increased (R. 76) until at the close of business on Sep-
tember 21, 1965, \Vheat Bros. was indebted to defend-
ant for overdrafts in the amount of $18,768.26 (R. 81; 
Ex. P-12). 
The bank officers were concerned about the part-
nership overdraft ( R. 112) and during the weeks pre-
ceding September 21 made frequent contacts with one 
or another of the partners to find out when it would be 
cleared (Ex. D-18; R. 83, 86, 87) . During these con-
versations the bank officers were told they were ac-
counts receivable that would be paid to the partnership 
and that deposits would be made to clear the overdraft 
5 
(R. 83, Ex. D-14). On about September 16, 1965, 
Jacobsen Construction Company drew a check in the 
amount of $18, 150.00 payable joinHl'" to ''\Vheat 
and Kaymac Sales" (Ex. P-11). 'Vheat llros. obtained 
the endorsement of Kaymac Sales Company on the 
check and in return gave Kaymac a \Vheat Bros. check 
for $12,000.00, drawn on defendant (Ex. P-13). 
On September 21, 1965, \Vheat .Bros. deposited 
the $18,150.00 check at defendant's Sugarhouse office 
together with some other checks in a total deposit of 
$21,320.08 (Ex. P-10, P-12). 
Jacobson Construction Company, drawer of the 
$18,150.00 check, was known to be a company of finan-
cial stability, and the bank had no worry about the 
availability of funds to pay the check ( R. 84). Never-
theless, the check was given special handling. Instead 
of sending it through with the rest of the deposit, the 
bank endorsed it "For Collection Only," and had it 
carried by special messenger to the drawee, Zions First 
National Bank (Ex. P-11; R. 75, 82, 85). Defendant 
obtained a cashier's check from Zions payable to defend-
ant, then deposited that check - not the Jacobsen check 
- in the ':Vheat Bros. account (R. 85). 
Defendant uses a computer system in connection 
with its checking accounts, and as soon as a deposit is 
placed into an account it is applied automatically against 
an overdraft. This happened with respect to the deposit 
made on September 21 (R. 86). Defendant dishonored 
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the check given to Kaymac (Ex. P-13), and immedi-
ately ceased its practice of honoring '¥"heat Bros. over-
drafts ( R. 86) . As soon as 'Vheat Bros. checks ha<l 
use<l the balance of the September 22 deposit, def end-
ant began returning checks unpaid whenever an over-
draft \Vas encountered. Thereafter, overdrafts were not 
countenced, though at times 'Vheat Bros. maintained 
a balance in the account and drew checks on that balance 
(R. 94). 
\Vith respect to overdrafts in the 'Vheat Bros. ae-
count, it was the practice of defendant's officers to con-
sider each overdraft before it was paid ( R. 78) ; in other 
words, 'Vheat Bros. was not permitted to maintain an 
overdraft position unless the payment of a particular 
item was expressly approved by a bank officer. 
On October 4, 1965, 'Vheat Bros. left with defend-
ant for deposit to its account the sum of $7,384.00, 
whereupon defendant immediately applied $5,131.25 of 
the deposit to pay itself the entire principal and interest 
on the note of :May 19, 1965, which had become due on 
August 17, 1965 ( R. 94-95) . Defendant's records show 
that the deposit was received and the application made 
the same day (Exs. P-12, P-14). 
Shortly before October 18, 1965, Joseph 'Vheat 
found it necessary to collect various sums in order to 
make a deposit to meet the partnership payroll, and on 
that date he took to defendant for deposit the sum of 
$4,153..J.8 (Ex. P-12). He handed the deposit to a 
7 
teller in the presence of the assistant manager, Jfoyd ._t 
Lindquist (R. 53, 54). No comment was made about 
setting this amount off, but on that same day defen<laiit 
took $4,050.00 (which depleted the amount on <leposi t ! 
and applied it agaiust the $5,000.00 note that had be-
come due on October 11, 1965 (Ex. P-1:?, R. 97). 
tober 18 was the first date after the note's due date 
when there was enough in the account to pay any sub-
stantial portion of the note (Ex. P-1:?), a fact of some 
significance inasmuch as Mr. Lindquist, the bank offi-
cer handling the account, belieYed that once an offset 
was made it had to be continued until the entire item 
was paid (R. 96). 
The applicatiou of the deposit to the note on Octo-
ber 18, 1965, was the last transaction in the account 
except for service charges, debit memos for returned 
checks, and two small deposits totaling $83.87. 
The partnership ceased to do business, though 
Joseph "\Vheat himself finished up the remaining work 
on the Kennecott Building. At the time of Mr. '¥heat's 
meeting with the bank officers, shortly after the Octo-
ber 18 set off, liabilities of 'Vheat Bros. totaled some-
thing in excess of $70,000.00 while the receivables to-
taled about $18,000.00 ( R. 57). 
On December 8, 1965, yoluntary petitions in bank-
ruptcy were filed by 'Vheat Bros. and the three part-
ners ( Exs. P-1 through P-4) . The schedules showed 
that the liabilities of the partnership and the partners 
substantially exceeded the assets, which was true at all 
8 
times withiu the four month period preceding bank-
ruptcy ( R. 59-60) . 
ARGlJ.MENT 
POINT I 
SECTION 68 OF TH.E BANKRUPTCY ACT 
(11 L'.S.C. §108) HAS NO APPLICATION TO 
THIS CASE. 
Plaintiff agrees that if the \Vheat Bros. deposits 
had been made in good faith, and in the ordinary course 
of business, defendant would have a right of set off by 
drtue of §68a of the Bankruptcy Act. But it is plain-
tiff's position in the present case that the preferential 
transfers occurred when the deposits were made, not 
wheu the bank set off the deposits in payment of Wheat 
Bros. debts. In order for §o8a to apply, the deposits 
must have been made in good faith, in the ordinary 
course of business, and in a general account subject to 
withdrawal. 
In actions brought under Section 60 of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, bank deposits have frequently been given 
special treatment, with and without reference to Section 
fi8, for the reason that although there is admittedly a 
"transfer of property" by the depositor to the bank, the 
transfer is often made in the regular course of business. 
the depositor having the right to draw checks upon the 
amount so deposited. All of the cases recognized, hmY-
9 
ever, that whether a bank deposit is a voidable prefer-
ence depends upon the circumstances under which the 
deposit was made. This is pointed out in 3 Collier 011 
Banh:ruptcy (14th Ed.), Para. 60.15: 
"As a general proposition it has been asserted 
that such a deposit of funds differs from other 
payments or transfers of money or property as 
contemplated by Section 60, in that it is with-
drawable at the will of the depositor and does 
not operate actually to diminish the depositor's 
estate. The reasoning has been that the ordinary 
deposit results in substituting for currency, bank 
notes, checks, drafts and other bankable items 
a corresponding credit with the bank which may 
be checked against or withdrawn, and which pro-
vides the depositor with the medium of exchange 
in universal use in the transaction of business. 
* * * " 
Because of the possibility that banks, partly under 
authority of Section 68 of the Uankruptcy Act, might 
utilize deposits to effect prohibited preferences, the 
courts have gradually worked out a set of principles, 
governing bank deposits. They are summarized in J 
Collier on Bankruptcy (14th Ed.), Para. 68.16[2]: 
"The o'eneral rule may first be stated that where b • 
an insolvent debtor makes general deposits with-
in four months of his bankruptcy, which deposits 
are accepted in good faith and in the regular 
course of business, the bank has a right to set off 
such deposits against an obligation owing to it 
by the depositor. * * * 
"It is only where affairs have reached such a 
point that the bank accepts the deposit for the 
10 
purpose of payment, or of giving itself a subse-
quent advantage over other creditors through 
its right of set-off, or for some other special pur-
pose, that the deposit and the subsequent appli-
cation of it amounts to a recoverable preference." 
The courts are in agreement that when a deposit 
is accepted for the purpose of payment of a debt, it con-
stitutes a transfer of property which is voidable under 
Section 60 and is not protected by the set-off provisions 
of Section 68 of llankruptcy Act. 
In Schmidt v. Bani.: of Commerce, 150 N .:M. 470, 
llO Pac. 613 ( 1910), a trustee had brought action 
against a bank for recovery of a deposit as a voidable 
preference. The trustee pre\'ailed in the lower court 
and 011 appeal the bank contended that it had the right 
to set off for the reason that the deposit had been re-
ceived in due course of business. The New Su-
preme Court said: 
"The court finds that the appellant pursuaded 
and induced the bankrupt to pay to them the 
amount of rnonev involved in this action for the 
express purpose. and with the intent to apply 
the same upon the indebtedness then owing by 
the bankrupt to appellant. This being so, no ques-
tion of the right of set-off for money deposited 
in the ordinary course of business, arises." 
In First National Bani..: of El Central v. Harper, 
254 Fed. 641 (9 Cir., 1918), it was held that where de-
posits are made not in the usual course of business, but 
to cover an overdraft, there is a preferential payment 
and the set off doctrine will not apply. And in In re 
11 
'1 
Henry C. Reusch & Co., 44 F. Supp. 677 (D.C .N.J., 
1942), the court held that a bank deposit made not i11 
the usual course of business, but with the intent that the 
deposit be applied to payment of an existing debt, is a 
transfer of property and a preference within the mean-
ing of the Bankruptcy Act. 
Kane v. First National Bank of El Paso, Te,r@, 
56 F.2d 534 (5th Cir., 1932), was a case in which a 
particular set off was upheld, but the bank recognized 
the rule applicable to the present case, saying: 
"\Ve thiuk that a deposit, though made by a11 
insolvent, if ill due course of business and really 
and in good faith intended at the time by th
0
c 
bani..: to create an equivalent liabili(lj to honor 
the checks to the depositor, is not a present de-
pletion of the depositor's estate, hut is a valid 
banking transaction which may be set off there-
after; but if bank in accepting the deposit 
does not intend to become liable to the depositor, 
but intends to uet payrnent by set-off, the ad-
vantaue obtained is rendered voidable by a bank-
ruptcy within four month." [Emphasis added. J 
The limitation on a bank's rights to receive deposits 
and apply them on indebtedness is well stated in Citizens 
·;y ational Bank of Gastonia, N. C. v. Linberg er, 45 
F.2d 522, 529 ( 1930), wherein the court stated: 
"Of course, where deposits are not made in the 
regular course of business, whe:e they are 
made fraudulently and collusIYely for the pur-
pose of giving bank a preference, or where 
they are not in realitu deposits at all, but are pay-
12 
rncnts, the right of set-off does not e.i'ist, and 
they may be recovered as preferential." (Em-
phasis added.) 
The rule is again well stated in 4 Collier on Bank-
ruptcy (14th Ed.), Para. where the follow-
ing statement is found: 
''As previously indicated, it is absolutely essen-
tial that before a bank can exercise its right and 
use the bankrupt's deposits as an offset, the 
deposits in question must have been accepted in 
good faith in the ordinary course of business. 
The usual .r;enera/ deposits made on an open 
checking account subject to withdrmtal at 7l'ill 
con.c;titutcs the t,1Jpe of deposits which will more 
often be considered above suspicion. But if the 
deposits are not accepted in the ordinary course 
of business, or are procured, accepted or 'built 
up' for the real purpose of permitting the bank 
to obtain a set-off, the deposits will be considered 
voidable preferential transfers and the right of 
set off is lost. * * * " (Emphasis added.) 
See also, Annotation, "Set-off by Bank Against 
Bankrupt's Deposit as a Preference "Tithin the Bank-
ruptcy Act," 85 A.L.R. 369; and 9 Am. J ur. 2d, llank-
rnptcy, 
The trial court found that the deposits in question 
were not made in the ordinary rnurse of business, but 
for the purpose of paying an antecedent debt. They 
were accepted by defendant for that purpose, wtihout 
regard to the intent of the depositor, and as the fore-
go-ing cases show, a mutual intent in this regard is not 
13 
necessary. The question is whether defendant accepted 
the deposits to let 'Vheat Bros. draw checks on them or 
whether it accepted them for the purpose of paying its 
debts. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COUU'l''S FINDINGS OF 
FACTS SHOULD BE UPHELD UNLESS 
THEY ARE CLEARLY AGAINST THE 
'VEIGfIT OF EVIDENCE. 
The argument of the defendant that the deposits 
made by \Vheat Bros. were in good faith and in the 
regular course of business and that it did not know or 
have reasonable cause to believe that \¥heat Bros. was 
insolvent at the time the deposits were made, must be 
considered in light of the fact that the issues were tried 
to the court on conflicting evidence, in a situation in 
which the court had an opportunity to consider the de-
meanor of the bank's officers. On the conflicting evi-
dence the issues were determined against the defendant 
bank. 
The Utah constitution, Article VIII, Section 9 
provides that in equity cases the appeal may be on ques-
tions of both law and fact, while in cases of law "the 
appeal shall be on questions of law alone." 
Under that provision this court has consistently 
recognized that in reviewing the findings and conclu-
14 
sions in an action at law the trial court will be sustained 
unless that is no legitimate proof to support them, L,11-
11urn 11. rPown of Price, 08 Utah 90, 222 Pac. 599 ( 192.t); 
or where there is "substantial evidence" to support them, 
()shorn v. Peters, 69 Utah 391, 255 Pac. 435 ( 1927) or 
unless the evidence "clearly through prepanderates" 
against the decision, Barlt'er v. Dnnham, 9 Utah 2d 244, 
;342 P.2d 867 (1959). 
Article VIII, Section 9 does not define "law" or 
"equity" cases for the purpose of determining the scope 
of review, and admittedly, the question needs to be re-
examined from time to time in light of new actions, 
statutory and remedies which may be pro-
vided under our general statute relating to the right to 
trial by jury. 
\Ve have been unable to find any Utah cases in 
which a determination has been made as to ,vhether an 
action to avoid preferences under Section 60b of the 
Bankruptcy Act is an "equity case" or a "case at law" 
for the purposes of review under the provisions of Arti-
cle Ylll, Section 9, Utah Constitution. But most other 
courts, including the federal courts, have regarded 60b 
proceedings as essentially law actions. Certainly they 
are more like law than equitable actions since there is 
nothing in them upon ·which the discretion of the judge 
or chancelor is required to operate. 
The accepted principle is stated in 5 Moore's Fed-
l'/'(tl Practice, Para. 38.30[4}, as follows: 
15 
" * * * Section 60b of the Bankruptcy Act 
provides that ''Vhere the preference is voidable, 
the trustee may recover the property or, if it has 
been cmwerted, its value from any person who 
has received or converted such property, except 
a bona-fide purchaser from or a lienor of the 
debtor's transferee for a present fair equivalent 
value * * *' At one time, prior to the Federal 
Rules, there was a division of authority whether 
the trustee's plenary action, if brought in a fed-
eral district court, should be on the law or equity 
side of the court-in other words whether it 
was a 'jury' or 'court' case. The Court in Schoen-
thal v. Irving Trust Company [287 U.S. 92, 
95, 53 Sup. Ct. 50, 77 L. Ed. 185 (1932)] set-
tled the matter by applying the same principles 
that it was accustomed to apply to other civil 
actions * * * As applied to a plenary action 
under the Rules the case means simply that if 
either the plaintiff or the defendant makes a 
timely demand for jury, an action by the trustee 
to recover a money judgment or property pref-
erentially transferred is legal in character and 
hence a jury action, unless there are facts or 
circumstances that render the legal remedy in-
adequate * * *." 
See also, 3 Collier on Bankruptcy (14th Ed.), Par. 
60.60 [1.2}. 
The action in this case is essentially one at law with-
in the meaning of the U tab Constitutional provision 
relating to appellate review, and the appeal must be re-
stricted to questions of ]aw. In J(eller v. Deseret Mortu-
ary Company, 23 Utah 2d 1, 455 P.2d 197 (1969), in 
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,vhich a trial court findi11g in a breach of contract was 
being reviewed, the court said: 
"The contract was silent as to the point of 
dispute just stated. The trial court properly 
heard extraneous evidence bearing on the issue, 
which he resolved in favor of the plaintiff. In-
asmuch as there is substantial, reasonable and 
credible evidence to support his finding, it is 
not our prerogative to upset it. This same well-
worn and time-honored rule of review likewise 
applies to and disposes of the defendant's con-
tention that the trial court erred in finding that 
the plaintiff had performed the construction in 
a good and workmanlike manner; and to the 
issue raised that the amount of damages awarded 
was excessive, to which we next direct our atten-
tion." 
Thus if there was any substantial evidence to sup-
port the findings of fact of the court below, the judg-
ment should be affirmed. Determination of whether 
there is substantial evidence should be made in light of 
the fact that the trial court listened to the testimony of 
the two officers of defendant who were in charge of the 
branch which handled the transaction, and were directly 
involved in them. 
In Child v. Child, 8 Utah 2d 261, 332 P.2d 981 
( 1958) which was essentially an equitable action the 
trial court entered a judgment compelling re-convey-
ance of certain land. On appeal the defendant con-
tended, among other things, that the findings were not 
supported by the evidence, the plaintiff there having 
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had the burden of establishing right to re-conveyance 
by "clear and convincing evidence." In disposing of the 
contention on appeal, the court said: 
" * * * Inasmuch as the burden rests upon 
the defendants to demonstrate that the trial court 
was in error, the findings and judgrnent should 
not be disturbed unless we can say affirmatively, 
and with sorne dcyree of assurance, that there 
is no reasonable base in the evidence upon which 
he could fairly and rationally have thought that 
the requisite degree of proof, i.e., by clear and 
convincing evidence, was met." [Emphasis add-
ed.] 
\Vith respect to the trial court's opportunity to 
observe the witnesses the court said: 
"Passing upon the credibility of witnesses 
involves to some extent the judging of what goes 
on in the minds of others and is therefore fraught 
with uncertainty. * * * [The witness's] appear-
ance and demeanor, his manner of expression 
and his tone of voice, his apparent frankness and 
candor, or want of it; his forthrightness in 
answering, or his tendency to hesitate or evade, 
and in fact his whole personality go into the 
composite effect of the testimony. * * * In addi-
tion to the personality aspects involved in the 
interpretation and evaluation of testimony, there 
are also difficulties to be encountered because 
of the uncertainaties found in the fact situations 
themselves which must be correlated to the testi-
monv of the witnesses. 'Ve have heretofore 
pointed out the trial court's advantages in judg-
ing the credibility of witnesses and 
the facts. It is due to these considerations that 
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it is firmly established that passing on such mat-
ters is exclusively within his province." 
As will be pointed out hereafter, there is sufficient 
evidence to support the findings made by the trial 
court - whether the review is at law or in equity. 
POINT Ill 
THE EYIDENCE SUPP 0 RT S THE 
COURT'S .FINDINGS THAT THE DEPOSITS 
MADE BY \VHEAT BROS. \VERE :NOT 
l\1ADE IN GOOD .FAITH AND IN THE REG-
ULAR COURSE OF BUSINESS. 
The burden on the appellant in this appeal is to 
demonstrate that there is no substantial evidence to sup-
port the fin dings of the trial court. The fin dings re-
l a ting to the making of the bank deposits were as fol-
lows: 
"5. On September 21, 1965, \Vheat Bros. 
delivered to the defendant what was designated 
a deposit in the said checking account. The de-
posit included, among other things, a check in 
the amount of $18,150.00 drawn by Jacobsen 
Construction Company payable jointly to '\Vheat 
Bros. & Kaymac Sales.' 
"6. The deposit of said $18,150.00 check was 
made by \Vheat Bros. and received by defendant 
for the purpose of clearing all or a portion of 
the oyerdraft indebtedness referred to above, and 
said check "'as applied by defendant upon pay-
ment of said overdraft. * * * 
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"8. The deposit was not made and received 
in the ordinary course of business, but for the 
purpose of paying an antecedent debt. 
"9. On October 4, 1965, \Vheat Bros. was 
indebted to defendant on a promissory note in 
the face [amount] of Five Thousand Dollars 
dated l\tlay 19, 1965, and with a maturity date of 
August 17, 1965. 
"IO. On October 4, 1965, \Vheat Bros. left 
with defendant a deposit in the amount of 
$7 ,384.00 to be placed in its checking account, 
whereupon the defendant immediately applied 
$5,131.25 in payment of the entire principal and 
interest of said note. 
"11. The deposit was not made in the ordinary 
course of business, but was accepted and received 
by the defendant for the purpose of applying 
it immediately in payment of the said promissory 
note. 
"12. At the time of the deposit and the appli-
cation thereof to the said note, no new considera-
tion was given by the defendant to Wheat Eros. 
and the deposit was made in payment of an 
antecedent debt. 
"13. On October 18, 1965, \Vheat Eros. was 
indebted to the defendant on a promissory note 
dated July 13, 1965, in the face amount of 
$5,000.00, the note having become due on Octo-
ber 11, 1965. 
"14. On or about October 18, 1965, Wheat 
Eros. left with defendant a deposit of $4,153.48 
to be placed in its checking account, whereupon 
the defendant immediately applied $4,050.00 
toward payment of the said note. 
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"15. The deposit was not in the ordinary 
of business, but was accepted and re-
ceived by defendant for the purpose of imme-
diately applying it upon the payment of said 
promissory note." 
The findings make it clear that the court was not 
dealing with the bank's right of set off as such, but with 
the intent and purpose for which particular deposits 
were made by ·yvheat Bros., or received by the defend-
ant. Since it is the deposit and not the set off which is 
the matter in controversy, defendant's extensive discus-
sion of Section 68 of the Bankruptcy Act has no bearing 
upon the accuracy of the court's findings of fact, or the 
Yalidity of its conclusions of law. 
The defendant seem to recognize this in its brief 
when it states at page 11 that the "deposit is the key 
factor in the allowability of set off and not the set off." 
In this case there is ample evidence not only to 
support the findings made by the trial court but to 
demand them, particularly when considered in light of 
the failure of the respondent to come forward with forth-
right explanations of the transactions in question. 
With respect to the $18,150.00 deposit, the first 
in the series, the evidence demands a finding that it 
was not accepted and received by defendant in the 
ordinary course of business. Prior to September 21, 
1965, 'Vheat Bros.' overdraft had been building up 
for a number of weeks and the bank officers had been 
after the partners to make a deposit to "clear the over-
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draft" ( R. 83) . The deposit made on September 21 
contained the $18,150.00 check in question together with 
several small checks and one over $2,800.00 (Ex. P-10). 
All but the $18,150.00 check were processed in the 
usual manner, but it was singled out, removed from the 
deposit, endorsed "for collection only., by an officer 
of the bank, and hand-carried to the drawee bank where 
a cashier's check payable to defendant 'vas obtained. 
It was this cashier's check that was deposited in th.e 
\Vheat Bros. account, and the overdraft was applied 
against it simultaneously. As soon as the overdraft was 
cleared, defendant changed its policy with respect to , 
'Vheat Bros. and overdrafts were no longer permitted 
(R. 86). 
Defendant's endorsing officer, l\fr. Boyd Lind-
quist, admitted that the $18,150.00 check was not han-
dled in the regular course of business : 
"Q. In the usual checking transaction, or de-
posit transaction, the bank does not endorse the 
check for collection, does it, send it by messenger 
or things of that kind, to obtain the funds, or 
not in the normal course? 
A. No." (R. 75). 
"Q. That is to say that the Jacobsen check that 
is 'P-11' was endorsed for collection, is that cor-
rect? 
A. That is correct. 




Q. And collected at Zions, and was a cashier's 
check obtain from Zions? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, who decided to handle that item in that 
particular way ? 
A. I would say .Mr. Yincent and myself. 
Q. Did vou discuss the matter? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And discussed with .Mr. Vincent the advis-
ability of having the item collected rather than 
run through the ordinary course? 
A. Yes." ( R. 82-83. 
Other testimony indicated that such special handing 
would be given deposits only if the depositor requested 
it, or if the checks were large and there was a question 
of their not being good, or of payment being stopped. 
There was no concern on the part of defendant that 
the check was no good or that payment would be stopped 
inasmuch as the drawer, Jacobsen Construction Com-
pany, was one of the largest and most reputable con-
tracting firms in the State. 
Of great importance also is the fact that the 
$18,150.00 deposit was specifically looked toward and 
earmarked for the purpose of covering the overdraft. 
The law is summarized in 4 Collier on Bankruptcy (14th 
Ed.) Para. 68.16[2.l} as follows: 
" * * * the deposits in question must have been 
accepted in good faith in the ordinary course of 
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busiuess. The usual general deposits made 011 au 
open checking account subject to withdrawal at 
will constitutes the type of deposits which will 
more often be considered above suspicion. But 
if the deposits are not accepted in the ordinary 
course of business, or are procured, accepted o.r 
'built up' for the real purpose of permitting the 
bank tu obtain a the deposits will be con-
sidered voidable preferential transfers and the 
right of set-off is lost. * * * (Emphasis added.} 
Defendant's argument that there must be "collu-
sion," or at least a mutual intent or understanding be-
tween the depositor and the bank that the deposit will 
be used to cover antecedent obligations, is not supported 
by the authorities. As stated in the annotation at 85 
A.L.R. 380: 
"Thus, if a bank permits its debtor to continue 
in business and to make deposits, knowing that 
he is in failing circumstances, and with the inten-
tion of obtaining a greater share of his property 
than other creditors, the deposits so made cannot 
be set off against the bank's demands against the 
depositor, although there is no proof of collusion 
between the parties." (Emphasis added.] 
In any event, the court could have found a mutual 
intent. Mr. Lindquist testified as follows: 
"Q. (By l\Ir. Allen). Will you relate the con-
versation between yourself and i\-1r. John \Vheat 
on that occasion to the financial condi-
tion, or obligations of \-\rheat Bros.? 
A. At that time we made our visit there it was 
primarily concernmg the overdraft which we 
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were carrying on their account, and wished to 
talk to him concerning clearing the overdraft. 
They indicated to us at that time that they 
would give us a list of accounts receivable from 
various contractors that would be deposited to 
the account. 
* * * 
Q. "T as there further specific conversation, .Mr. 
Lindquist relating to which of the receivables 
would be used for liquidation or clearing up of 
their overdraft in your bank? 
A. I am sure that we were looking to the Jacob-
sen deposit for clcariny t/ie immediate overdraft 
that we had." (R. 102, 103) [Emphasis added.} 
Subsequently .Mr. Lindquist testified: 
"Q. No assignment was made to you by the 
':Vheats of the Jacobsen money, was there? 
A. No. 
Q. And there was no set agreements, as far as 
you are aware, that any particular moneys would 
be used to clear the overdraft? 
A. Well, we had a conversation that t/ie Jacob-
sen check would be deposited to the accownt, but 
there was no assignment taken on it as such." 
(R. 110). 
The defendant's officers had even called Jacobsen 
Construction Company to verify that the check would 
be received by 'Vheat Bros. ( R. 108). 
Of equal importance is the fact that ':Vheat Bros. 
was never given any opportunity to draw against the 
deposit. Thus, the rationale for excepting certain bank 
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transactions from the effects of Section 60 are nut 
applicable. The rationale stated in 9 Am. J ur. 2d, Bank-
ruptcy, §525 is as follows: 
"A deposit in the usual course of business in 
good faith to the open or general account of the 
depositor, subject to his check, does not result 
in a preferential transfer, notwithstanding it 
may replace the bank in position, in the event 1 
of depositor's bankruptcy, to set off the deposit 
against his debt to the bank. The rule applies 
to a deposit made subject to the collection of the 
definite items thereof if the intent at the time 
of the deposit was that the checks against it 
would be honored when the items were collected. 
The principal reason which the courts have as-
signed for t,he rule is that when a deposit is made 
under the circurnstances indicated, there is no 
diminution of the depositor's estate, since he 
thereby receives an equivalent credit, which u 
immediately available to him." [Emphasis add- , 
ed.] 
When the total deposit made on September 21 is 
analyzed, the distinction becomes readily apparent. Of 
that deposit the sum of $18,150.00 (evidenced by the 
Jacobsen Construction Company check) was a prefer-
ential transfer. The balance was handled differently, 
and probably was not. The bank had been waiting for 
the Jacobsen check to cover the overdrafts, and as soon 
as it was received it was given special handling and 
used to pay the overdraft before Wheat Bros. had any 
chance to draw against any part of it. 
'Vhile the circumstances are somewhat different 
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with respect to the two subsequent deposits found bv 
the trial court to have constituted preferential transfers, 
it is clear that the bank accepted each deposit for the 
purpose of paying existing indebtedness. 
When the \Vheat Bros. overdraft was cleared on 
September 22, a small balance remained in the account 
from which some checks were paid, but as soon as the 
balance was exhausted, no checks were honored until 
September 24 when a deposit of $999.56 was made. 
Another deposit of $3,283.03 was made on September 
29 and Wheat Bros. was permitted to draw on it. Even 
before checks totaling the whole amount of the deposit 
had been drawn defendant applied debit memos and 
service charges against the account and commenced to 
return checks and debit the account for their return. 
\Vheat Bros.' checks were paid (from a credit balance 
-uot by way of ovedraft) between September 30 and 
October 4, at which time a deposit of $7,384.00 was 
made. Immediately defendant set off $5,131.25, the 
full principal and interest of a note which had become 
due on August 17. It seems quite clear that the bank 
had theretofore decided that as soon as the large enough 
deposit was received, it would be used to pay the note. 
This is consistent with Mr. Lindquist's understanding 
that once set off is made, the bank must continue to 
set off until the note is paid. The bank had allowed two 
previous smaller deposits (neither large enough to pay 
the note) to be drawn against ( R. 96) . These facts, con-
sidered in light of the bank's knowledge, its termination 
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of overdrafts, and the constant vigilance with respect 
to the 'Vheat Bros. account constitute ample evidence 
to support a finding that the deposit was received for 
the purpose of paying the note. 
After appliction of the deposit to payment of the 
first note, additional \Vheat Bros. checks were paid 
from small credit balances until October u, when the 
account was depleted. Defendant ceased paying checks 
and debited the account $2.00 at a time for returne<l 
items. A deposit of approximately $3, 700.00 was made 
on October 8; but on October 11, when the second 
$5,000.00 note became due, there was only $1,200.00 
in the account. \Vheat Bros. drew checks on this amount 
until the account was again depleted. Thenceforth 
checks were returned and charges made. \Vhen a deposit 
sufficient to pay most of the second $5,000.00 note was 
received, the bank again decided to set off. On October 
18, 1965, the date of Joseph \Vheat's deposit of 
$4,153.48 to meet the partnership payroll, defendant ' 
applied a small portion of this to clearing an overdraft 
(resulting primarily if not exclusively from debit 
memos) and the balance in payment on the note. 
In determining whether deposits are made in the ' 
ordinary course of business the courts may consider all 
the circumstances surrounding the deposits including 
the bank's knowledge of the depositor's financial con-
dition and may make inferences from the failure of 
the bank to come forward with any explanation sur-
rounding the time sequence and the methods followed 
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by the bank in making the offsets against the nole. 
The rule is well stated in 9 Am. J ur.2d Bankruptcy, 
as follows: 
"A deposit may be preferential, where made 
in the 4-month period, and not in the ordinary 
course of business, but for the purpose of bene-
fiting the bank by affording a setoff. Any state 
of facts which takes a deposit within the 4-month 
period out of the class of deposits made in good 
faith in the ordinary course of business, subjec_t 
to the depositor's check-in other words, any 
situation under which the deposit is merely a 
form of pa;yment to the bank-1narks the deposit 
a preferential transfer which, if the necessary 
knowledge of, or reasonable cause to believe in, 
the insolvency of the depositor is present on the 
part of the bank, constitutes a voidable prefer-
ence precluding the possibility of a setoff. The 
settled rule, it has been said, is that if the deposits 
are made in order that the bank may apply them 
to the reduction of the depositor's indebtedness, 
there is in effect. a preferential payment, void-
able in the event the bank had 'reasonable cause 
to believe the debtor to be insolvent.' 
"The same circumstances of preferential pay-
ment may be created where, although a deposit 
is made in the usual course of business, the bank 
intends thereby to obtain a preference, so that 
the ordinary relation of banker and depositor, 
wherebv the depositor receives in return for his 
deposit. the obligation of the bank to repay him, 
does not obtain." [Emphasis added. J 
In a footnote to the above citation it is said: 
"If at the time the deposits are received there 
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is not an intent in good faith to increase the 
checking account, but to arrange for an offset 
there is in truth not a deposit, but a payment 
which is a preference." 
From a review of defendant's brief it would appear 
that there is not much disagreement between the parties 
over the principles of law relating to the above point. 
Rather, the dispute is centered around the application 
of such principles to the facts of this case .. Most of the 
cases cited by defendant hold that if the deposit was 
made or accepted for the purpose of paying existing 
indebtedness there is no right of set off. They also 
recognize that there is no right of set off unless the 
deposit is subject to withdrawal at the will of depositor. 
Both propositions are made abundantly clear in almost 
every case and authority quoted by defendant in its 
brief. 
Defendant cites New York County National Ban/-.; 
v. Massey, 192 U.S. 138, 40 L. Ed. 380, 24 Sup. Ct. 
199 ( 1904), but in that case the court specifically noted 
that there was no diminution of the bankrupt's estate 
because he had a right to draw upon the deposit. That 
case involved the usual situation where the bank is 
both a creditor and a debtor of the bankrupt at the 
time of the bankruptcy. The court allowed the bank to 
set off amounts on deposit against an oYerdue promis-
sory note. This is a far different thing than accepting 
deposits before bankruptcy with the intent of applying 
them against a debt 
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Defendant also cites White v. Pacific Sout/i7.cesl 
Trust & Savings Bank, 9 F.2d 650 (D.C. Calif., 1926) 
and erroneously states that the court did not require 
the two banks to return the money. Following the quo-
tation which appears in appellant's brief, is this: 
"Now, were the deposits in the two banks, 
which were off set, general deposits made in the 
ordinary course of business? I think not. Not 
only was each bank fully acquainted with Foley's 
financial difficulties from December, 1922, but 
each bank had signed the agreements by which 
Foley divested himself of his property and busi-
ness. 
* * * * 
"I conclude the main question in these cases 
by holding that, as between the plaintiff trustee 
in bankruptcy and each defendant bank, all of 
the monev sued for should be delivered to the 
plaintiff for administration and distribution in 
accordance with the National Bankruptcy Law, 
and each bank may enlarge, modify, or file claims 
against the proper bankrupt estates for the 
amounts of their claims, respectively, affected 
by this decision." 
Hughes v. Machen, 164 F. 2d 983 (4th Cir., 1947), 
cited by defendant, involved two banks taking over de-
posits which had existed for some time and applying 
them to large notes when they learned of the insolvent 
condition of the bankrupt. In addition, one of the 
banks, having received a check from the government 
payable to the bankrupt, had delivered half of the pro-
ceeds to a third party and credited the balance against 
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the bankrupt's notes. The trustees of the bankrupt ent-
ered into a compromise agreement under which one. 
half would be returned to the trustee, but it was allowed 
to retain the balance that existed in the account prior ., 
to the set off. Certain creditors of the bankrupt objected. 
The court noted that the creditors could not show that 
deposits were built up in an abnormal way in order tu 
give the bank an opportunity to credit them on the notes 
and reduce the debt and also there had been no restric- ' 
tions placed on withdrawal from the accounts. The 
court stated: 
"Of course the application of these principles 
presupposes that there has been a bona fide de- · 
posit made in due course of business. Thus where 
there has been a deliberate building up of the 
account for the purpose of enabling the bank to 
obtain a preference, or where the deposit is 
accepted by the bank with the intent of appl!J-
iny it tu the depositor's obliyations rather than 
subjecting it to his power of withdrawal, an at-
tempt on the part of the bank to set off the 
deposit will result in a preference as long as the 
other conditions of Section 60 are satisfied. (Cit-
ing cases.) This result is reached because the 
apparent deposit is in fact a payment to the bank 
and the bankruptcy court will look through form 
to substance and treat the deposit as a transfer 
of property for or on account of an antecedent 
debt." [Emphasis added. J 
Defendant also relies upon Farmers Bank of 
j}fissouri v. Julian, 383 F. 2d 314 (8th Cir., 1967). The 
facts in that case are quite different from those in the 
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present case. There the bank had the understanding 
that its obligations would be paid as soon as the bank-
rupt obtained a long-term operating loan from Com-
mercial Credit Corporation. The bank's officers had 
gone to the banqrupt' s place of business to attend a 
meeting with officers of the bankrupt and the credit cor-
poration. At the meeting, it learned that the long-term 
operating loan was not going to be made. Consequently 
the officer returned to the bank and applied funds which 
had been on deposit and subject to withdra>val by the 
bankrupt right up until that moment, against a $lti, 
000.00 promisory note. The court noted that certain 
checks had been honored that very day from the exist-
ing account and indicated that there was no evidence to 
show that the bank had decided to apply the set off any 
earlier than that day. This is considerably different than 
the present case where the bank waited to receive a 
specified check and immediately grabbed it. 
In the fairly recent case of Mayo v. Pioneer Bani.-
'* Trust Company, 270 F. 2d 823 (5th Cir., 1959), the 
court held that a deposit made under similar circum-
stances was a voidable preference, and said: 
" * * * [T]he trustees could attack the set off 
as a voidable preference if: (I) at the time of 
the deposits either the company or the bank in-
tended them to operate as payment of the debt 
rather than as an ordinary deposit subject to the 
depositor's withdrawal; ( 2) at the time of the 
deposit the depositor was in fact insolvent; and 
( 3) the bank had reasonable cause to believe the 
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depositor was insolvent at that time. Under the 
facts surrounding the Twin City deposit ,1 
think the deposit was for the purpose of 
ment of the debt. As soon as Gray received tht 
proceeds under the contract he transferred theu, 
by debit memorandum to the Bank. The deposit 
was rnade solely to repay the loan. It was a cloak 
for payment." [Emphasis added.} 
POINT IV 
THE EVIDENCE SUPP 0 RT S THE 
COURT'S .FINDING THAT AT THE TIME 
THE DEPOSITS WERE MADE BY WHEAT 
BROS., DEFENDANT HAD REASONABLE 
CAUSE TO BELIEVE THAT \VHEAT BROS. 
\VAS INSOLVENT. 
After hearing evidence, watching the demeanor of 
the witnesses and reviewing the exhibits admitted, the 
trial court was satisfied that at the time of each of the 
transfers, defendant not only had reasonable cause to 
believe that "\Vheat Bros. was insolvent but it actually 
knew that it was (R. 21, .Findings Nos. 19-20). 
Admittedly there is no direct testimony in this case 
that defendant actually knew of Wheat Bros. insolv-
ency at the time of the three transfers. However, the 
evidence leads inescapably to that conclusion. Moreover, 
the evidence is abundant that defendant had reasonable 
grounds to believe that Wheat Bros. was insolvent-
which is all the statute requires. 
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'Vhile the question is primarily one of fact the 
cases are helpful in describing the kinds of evidenee 
establishing reasonable cause to believe. 
One such case is Dean v. Planters National Bank 
of Hughes, 176 F. Supp. 909, 914 (D.C. Ark., 1959) : 
" * * * [T]here are a number of recurrent fac-
tors which are usually weighed and considered, 
such as: under eapitalization of the debtor, sales 
below cost, checks drawn on a bank account an<l 
payment refused by reason of insufficient funds, 
a consistent pattern of overdrafts, operating 
losses, irregular, unusual or criminal conduct, 
secretiveness, slow payment, collective measures 
taken by other creditors, rescue of debtor from 
embarrassment by friends or relatives, and re-
liance on financial statements or reports." 
In Boston National Bank v. Early, 17 F. 2d 691 
(1st Cir., 1927) a finding of reasonable cause to believe 
was upheld. The court of appeals regarded it as signi-
ficant that the president of the bank had renewed the 
bankrupt's note several times and knew that deposit 
balances were low, that checks were held until deposits 
were made to meet them, that the bank had demanded 
maintenance of a larger balance, that return of checks 
was threatened, and that the bank finally took perish-
able merchandise as security. 
Additional cases supporting respondent's position 
are T,Vaite v. Second National Bank, 168 F. 2d 984 (7th 
Cir., 1948), and In re Shelley Furniture, Inc., 283 }-.. 
2d .540 (7th Cir., 1960). 
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1\-Ioreover, it is clear that a creditor may not bury 
his head in the sand and ignore warning signals which 
if followed up, would disclose insolvency. He may not 
rely entirely upon the statements and representations of 
the debtor, particularly when there are suggestions that 
the debtor's representations may not be true. The court\ 
have uniformly followed the principle that if the credi. 
tor has notice of facts which would cause a reasonably 
prudent person to make inquiry he is chargeable with 
knowledge of what the inquiry would have revealed. 
The principle is explained in 3 Collier on Bank-
ruptcy (14th Ed.) Para. 60.53[1] as follows: 
"Knowledge of insolvency is not necessary, 
nor even actual belief thereof; all that is required 
is a reasonable cause to believe that the debtor 
was insolvent at the time of the preferential 
transfer. A creditor has reasonable cause to be-
lieve that the debtor is insolvent when such a 
state of facts is brought to the creditor's notice, 
respecting the affairs and pecuniary condition 
of the debtor, as would lead a prudent business 
person to the conclusion that the debtor is in-
solvent. Of course, a creditor may not willfully 
close his eyes that he might remain in ignorance 
of his debtor's condition. On the contrary, where 
circumstances are such as would incite a man 
of ordinary prudence to make inquiry, the credi-
tor is chargeable with notice of all facts which 
a reasonablv diligent inquiry would have dis-
closed. In ;uch case, an inquiry of the debtor 
alone is generally insufficient, where answer. 
wider the circumstances, could i:ead1ly have 
been found to be untrue. As a matter of fact, it is 
36 
the creditor's cause for belief and not the debtor's 
knowledge, or lack of it, that is important. And 
if the creditor fails to make an inquiry when he 
has a duty to do so, he will be charged with all 
the knowledge which he would have acquired 
had he conducted the investigation." 
In a case decided by the United States Court of 
Appeals, for the Tenth Circuit, Carroll v. Holliman, 
33ti F. 2d 4-25 (10th Cir., 1964) it was said: 
"[l}f the creditor has knowledge or notice of 
facts and circumstances which would incite a 
person of reasonable prudence under similar 
conditions to make an inquiry and, if such an 
inquiry would lead to the development of facts 
essential to the knowledge of the situation, the 
creditor is chargeable with such knowledge." 
Examining the evidence in the present case in light 
of the foregoing principle it is apparent not only that 
defendant had reasonable cause to believe that Wheat 
l:lros. was insolvent, but that in fact (through its offi-
cers) it so believed. For several months prior to Sep-
tember 20, 1965, there had been a consistent pattern of 
overdrafts in Wheat Bros.' account and they had been 
increasing steadily ( R. 76). For weeks preceding Sep-
tember 20, the bank officers had on various occasions 
contacted 'Vheat Bros. about clearing the overdrafts 
( R. 83). On September 20, two checks payable to 
Granite National Bank were presented to appellant's 
officers for a decision as to whether they should be hon-
ored (R. 77). As a result, an inquiry was made and 
appellant's officers learned that 'Vheat Bros. owed the 
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Granite National llank $5,000.00, plus interest, on 
0 
note ( R. 79) . This was one of a number of liabilitie.1 
which had not been disclosed on any financial statemeut 
furnished by \Vheat Bros. to defendant. At about tht 
same time, and prior to the deposit of the $18,150.00 
check on September 21, officers of defendant made iu-
quiry to Intermountain Association of Creditmen anci 
learned that Wheat Bros. had two substantial accounh 
payable to Bennetts and Fuller Paint which also had 
not been disclosed on the financial statement (R. 87).' 
The $18,150.00 check drawn by Jacobsen Construction 
Company was made payable to \Vheat Bros. and Kay. 
mac, and contemporaneously with the making of the de-
posit a check drawn payable to Kaymac, in the amount 
of $12,000.00, was presented to appellant for payment. 
Payment was ref used which, consistent with the bank's 
practice would indicate that either the manager or as-
sistant manager or assistant manager had reason to 
know that there was another very large obligation which 
had not been disclosed to appellant. In fact, a few <lap 
later, and prior to the payment of the first $5,000.00 
note, one of the bank officers had a conversation with 
an officer of Kaymac in which the bank officer was told 
that the indebtedness to a Kaymac was approximately 
$23,000.00 and the company was insisting on payment 
(R. 92, R. 109) .. Moreover, \Vheat Bros. continued to 
draw checks on insufficient funds, which were not hon-
ored, and the bank inquired from time to time of per-
sons who were said to have owed money to \Vheat Bros. 
The above circumstances were such that any reasonable 
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person in the position of defendant would have made u 
thorough inquiry as to the financial condition of Wheat 
Hros.-and there are some indications that this is ex-
aetly what defendant did. 
There is little question that if an inquiry and parti-
cularly an examination of 'Vheat Bros.' books and rec-
ords had been made by defendant the insolvent condition 
of \Vheat Bros. would readily have become apparent. 
After appellant took the deposit collected to meet 
'Vheat Bros.' payroll, one of appellant's officers sug-
gested to Joseph Wheat that the books and records of 
the company be brought in. This was done and the bank 
officers were immediately aware that \Vheat Bros. was 
insolvent ( R. 106). Mr. 'Vheat was told that the only 
hope for it was bankruptcy or a composition of credi-
tors ( R. 62). Moreover, one of the bank officers at al! 
earlier date had told Joseph '-'Theat that he had noticed 
that ever since Jim Wheat had left the management of 
the business it had gone down hill (R. 60). And, Jim 
\Vheat had been out of the business about four years 
IR. 61). 
The circumstances surrounding the 'Vheat Bros.' 
affairs were such that defendant must have known that 
it was insolvent, and the obligation of defendant to have 
made inquiry must be considered in light of its access 
to various sources of financial information, as well as 
that it had in fact received. It would be difficult to see 
how the court could have failed to find that the bank 
had reasonable cause to believe \Vheat Bros. was in-
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solvent on each of the dates on which transfers wert 
made. 
CONCLUSION 
The policy of Section 60 of the .Bankruptcy Act is 
to place creditors of the same class 011 an equal footing, 
so as to prevent one creditor, through the exercise of 
one type of pressure or another, from making itself' 
whole, or nearly so) at the expense of the others. 
Under Section 68 of the .Bankruptcy Act a bank 
may take advantage of a right of set off-but only if 
the were received by the bank in the ordinary· 
course of business and for the purpose of permitting the 
depositor to use the account, as by withdrawal. 
Circumstances surrounding the handling of the 
Wheat Bros. account make it clear that the deposits in 
question were not made in the ordinary course of busi- . 
ness. The two officers in charge of the bank's Sugar-
house office exercised a continuing surveillance of the 
Wheat Bros. account during all periods in which over-
drafts were permitted. At no time was \Vheat Bros. 
permitted to draw checks against its account at will. Al-' 
though the bank had some customers who were "pre-
f erred," and for whom tellers were generally authorized 
to pay overdrafts, this was not the case with \Vheat 
Bros. Before any \Vheat Bros. overdraft was paid, the 
item was presented to either l\ir. Lindquist or l\fr. Yin-
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cent for consideration, at which time a determination 
was made as to whether the item would be paid or not. 
The trial court might well have found that the en-
tire deposit made on September 21, insofar as it was 
applied against the overdraft, was not received by the 
bank in the ordinary course of business. It is arguable, 
indeed. that where a bank's computer automatically 
charges deposits against overdrafts, without first giving 
the depositor an opportunity to draw against them, 
such deposits cannot be made in the "ordinary course of 
business" as that term is used in the older cases. Such 
handling of an account becomes a personal matter in 
which the bank officers, on a day-to-day basis, decide 
whether to extend additional credit, and deposits and 
withdrawals are incident to this activity. 
At the time of receipt of the $18,150.00 check the 
bank's officers had abundant information to the effect 
that 'Vheat Bros. was not telling the truth about its 
financial condition, that the condition was steadily 
worsening, and that the company was, in fact, insolYent. 
From that day forward, the information obtained by 
and available to the bank with respect to the involvency 
of 'Vheat Bros. never decreased. The "reasonable 
cause to believe" was an ascending one. 
Banks should be required to come forward with 
forthright, believable testimony to a trial court respect-
ing the circumstances surrounding deposits and set off's. 
After all, what does a bank have to lose by taking a 
preference? The most that is required of it under the 
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Bankruptcy Act is that it pay back what it took, anli · 
stand in line with its fellow creditors. Defendant shoulci 
do so in this case. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BRYCE E. ROE 
340 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Respondent 
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